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A stunning array of references burgeon forth from this text. Heyes has clearly done 
her homework. If the stated purpose of Oxford University Press’s “Studies in Femin-
ist Philosophy Series” was to showcase cutting-edge feminist approaches to philoso-
phy, then it has accomplished this goal with Cressida J. Heyes’s Self-Transformations: 
Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies. For the most part the book utilizes a Foucaul-
dian understanding of ethics that is not less concerned with producing a moral 
judgment of rights and wrongs, than it is with producing an “askesis of freedom.” 
This means creating a notion of self-becoming that is a product of what we desire 
ourselves to become, implying a power relation that is productive rather than re-
pressive. As Heyes tells us, transforming the self entails a disciplined, meditative 
perseverance that is less achieved by turning the body into a perfect form than it is 
by an affirmation of the process itself. Heyes says that she rejects “teleological con-
ceptions of the body,” and this book approaches ethics in this provocative, cutting-
edge manner. Rather than evaluating whether or not weight loss programs are 
“good” or “bad” Heyes challenges readers to view the dieting process as being an 
expression of great self-control. Fusing her text with Buddhist thinking, Heyes says 
that if there is such a thing as a human essence it is a “vessel of joy-- a joy that comes 
not from the ego’s achievements, but from a deep sense of unity and connection with 
all things.” (p.4) Obsessing over one’s body often distracts from this basic human 
desire to experience joy, but the process of self-transformation can often result in an 
extremely intense focus of the mind and body that can both generate and deepen 
feelings of joy. She remarks on the great sense of relief in accomplishing a goal after 
a long, concerted effort. The dark side of this approach is that it can turn into a mo-
nomaniacal obsession. 
Heyes has a deep sense of empathy with the transgendered subject, the 
weight-watchers subject, and the vulnerable woman who chooses to undergo the 
radical transformation that accompanies plastic surgery. She does not lump all of 
these subjectivities under one classification, as she is aware of difference; more im-
portantly, Heyes is unafraid to explore the biopolitical underpinnings of these trans-
formative phenomena. She shows how people are guided by doctors and health offi-
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cials into believing that without these life-altering self-transformations their psycho-
logical well-being, even their lives, may be at stake. The message doctors too often 
give to patients pressuring them to shave off poundage is often, “lose weight and 
your future morbidity may decrease.” (p.5) She also shows how with the recent in-
vention of online discussion boards, these varied subjectivities are becoming a spe-
cies all to themselves. Keeping track of one’s weight loss progress and knowing the 
nuanced art form of calorie counting are ways of gaining acceptance in the world of 
dieters.  
Confronted by a deluge of books discussing “normalization,” Heyes is also 
extremely careful in the way she uses the term. She sees this term as being a manife-
station of disciplinary power, which is not a substance, but rather a series of circulat-
ing relations that cannot easily be located in an individual or an institution. Discipli-
nary power is constitutive rather than external to the subject it creates, rather than 
being imposed upon a type of individual. Its functioning is based on a productive 
power relation, creating the self, rather than being a repressive hypothesis, and there 
is a power relation that consists of liberating a person’s inner-self: saying “yes” to 
what is within rather than “no.” This disciplinary type of power holds the possibility 
of exhilarating people to the point of incredible joy and euphoria while achieving 
ones goals, or to obsessions that manifest in subjects who can think of nothing but 
changing their body. She insists that obsessing over transforming one’s body is most 
often the result of a culture industry that insidiously permeates society with images 
of what the desirable female body type should be. The problem is that she insists on 
the one hand that women are not “mere dupes” of a patriarchal culture, yet also in-
sists that media play a crucial role in shaping social norms, media that are still pre-
dominantly run by men. From here she goes on to show the fallacies in glamorizing 
a skinny female body type because it limits a woman’s ability to defend herself, pre-
sumably from the aggression of stronger male bodies, and also limits a woman’s 
ability to take on manual labor, traditionally a male line of work. Although a cardi-
ologist would undoubtedly disagree, Heyes shows how desiring a thin female body 
is not causally related to health problems. Surprisingly, Heyes says that there is no 
link between obesity and poor health, which runs contrary to dominant medical and 
governmental discourse on the subject. These institutions presumably form a pow-
er/knowledge nexus that propagates a message that there is an obesity epidemic, 
and that weight reduction leads to better health. For Heyes, obesity is instead linked 
to social functionalism regarding what is a proper woman’s role within a patriarchal 
society, even if we are not to believe that women are dupes of this system. 
One of the bright spots for scholars of Foucault comes toward the end of the 
book. Heyes holds steadfast to the legacy of Foucault as a thinker who was deeply 
concerned about the way technologies of the self constitute a subjectivity within a 
nexus of power/knowledge, but from the perspective of an ethical agent who must 
establish a relation to his or her own subjectivity as a supplement of a larger histori-
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cal viewpoint. Heyes is rightly disturbed by various culture warriors working inside 
and outside of the academy who have made a cottage industry out of slandering 
Foucault in the hopes of discrediting his entire body of work. She says, “some ad ho-
minem and possibly homophobic readings of Foucault’s biography generate the im-
pression that he became, eventually, a decadent dilettante (i.e., promiscuous, unre-
morseful, eclectic, queer), rather than a serious scholar (i.e., dogged, earnest, narrow-
ly focused, straight). As a colleague in philosophy once rhetorically asked me, “Fou-
cault? Wasn’t he some kind of crackpot?” Undoubtedly, most Foucault scholars have 
more than likely dealt with this uninformed view of the Foucault, which is based 
more on gossip than serious engagement with his texts. Heyes meets this critique by 
saying, “By remaining feisty, unpredictable, radical and critical, Foucault exempli-
fies a political personality and an ethical attitude that does not crumble in the ab-
sence of self-certainty.” In her view, Foucault stands in stark contrast to other cano-
nized philosophers such as Nietzsche, who, Heyes says, epitomizes a certain type of 
academic aura-building that goes into creating a “heroic male intellectual.” Foucault 
is a different kind of philosopher, whose writings, according to Heyes, are absolute-
ly conducive to a feminist interpretation primarily because of his concern regarding 
transformations of all bodies. That makes Foucault’s work anti-programmatic and a 
joy to interpret and discuss. 
As a feminist scholar Heyes is disconcerted by the lackadaisical manner in 
which early feminist interpretations explained such self-transformations as dieting 
and plastic surgery in simplistic terms. Often these feminists concluded that the fe-
male was an oblivious dupe of patriarchy and then proceeded to paint a bleak pic-
ture of society with broad brushstrokes that showed it to be male-dominated. Heyes, 
inspired by Foucault, instead proposes that feminists and intellectuals in the social 
sciences and humanities take into account the personal narrative behind a self-
transformation. Such an approach will help us better understand why an individual 
desires to alter her/his body, instead of producing universal theories to encompass 
all vaguely similar alterations. She is also sympathetic to the view that subjectivity is 
always created out of inter-connected relations of power. 
The self is always caught up in these interconnected networks of gender 
normalization, but that is not to say the subjects are simply victims without hope of 
extrication. There is hope, Heyes maintains; in fact, one of her own ethical tenets is 
that feminists must not give in to intellectually-inflected despair (p. 112), and to real-
ize that hope cannot be generated by means of a discourse of political or ethical con-
demnation. 
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